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It is not necessary that the purchaser be made known to the
owner as the broker's customer if he is so in fact. The owner is
entitled to know that the broker has been instrumental in sending
him the customer; but when advised by the latter that he has
received information of the purpose to sell, and the price, it is the
owner's duty to inquire whence the information was derived: Lloyd
v. Matthews, 51 N. Y. 124. The purchaser need not be introduced
to the owner by the broker; and the latter need not be personally
acquainted with the purchaser, to entitle him to commission. The
question is, was the broker the procuring cause of the sale: Sussdorff v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319.
The contract between the broker and his principal need not be
in writing in order to enable him to recover: Barnardv. Monnot, 3
Keyes 203 ; s. c. 33 How. Pr. 440 ; Hfeinrichv. .Korn, 4 Daly 74;
Tischer v. Bell, 91 Ind. 243.
W. W. THORNTON.
Crawfordsville, 1ad.
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CARROLL v. BONHAN.
The statute of New Jersey in relation to nuncupative wills (Revision, 1245) provides, inter alia, that such will must have been made at the time of the I last sickness" of the testator or testatrix : Held, that the term "last sickness" in said provision, is to be construed as meaning " in extremis," and that, therefore, an alleged
nuncupative will made by a testatrix during her last illness, nine days before her
death, cannot be admitted to probate, where the proof is clear that she had time and
capacity to subsequently make a written will if she had so desired.

APPEAL from decree of Hunterdon Orphans' Court, refusing to
admit to probate an alleged nuncupative will.

VFoorhee8 6. Cotter, for appellant.
R. S. KYuhl, for respondent.
RuN oN, Ordinary.-Asher W. Carroll, the appellant, propounded
for probate in the Orphans' Court of Hunterdon county an alleged
nuncupative will of his sister, Mary Ann Bonhan, late of that
county, deceased, who was the wife of the respondent, Moses Eonban. The alleged nuncupative will was made on the 9th of April
1886. Mrs. Bonhan was then living with her husband at her home
in Hunterdon county. She was ill, and continued to be so until
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she died on the 18th of the same month. The alleged will was
offered for probate by petition on the 2d of June 1886. After
hearing the matter, upon due notice, the Orphans' Court decreed that
the proof was not satisfactory, and dismissed the petition without
costs. By the supposed will, Mrs. Bonhan attempted to dispose of
personal property of more than the value of $80. But both previously and subsequently she attempted to dispose of other parts
of her personal property. The statute provides that a verbal will
'(it does not extend to those made by soldiers in actual military service, or mariners or seamen at sea disposing of their movables,
wages and personal estate), to be valid must, if the property exceed
the value of $80, be proved by the oaths of three witnesses, at
least, who were present at the making thereof; and it must be
proved that the testator or testatrix, at the time of pronouncing the
will, bade the persons present, or some of them, bear witness that
such was his or her will, or words to that effect. It provides also
that such will must have been made in the time of the last sickness
of the testator or testatrix, and in the house of his or her habitation
or dwelling, or where he or she had been resident for the space of
ten days or more next before the making of the will, except where
he or she was surprised or taken sick, being from his or her own
house, and died before he or she returned to the place of his or her
dwelling. Revision 1245.
It is well established that the term "last sickness" in the foregoing provisions is not to be construed as signifying merely the illness, without regard to its duration which terminated in the alleged
testator's death, but as meaning in extremis (Prince v. Hazelton,
20 Johns. 502; YarnalF8 Will, 4 Rawle 46 ; 1 Redf. Wills 185);
that is, the law contemplates sudden and severe illnesss immediately
preceding physical dissolution, when there is neither time nor
opportunity to make a written will, and therefore, in such case, if
there is to be a will, it must of necessity be a merely verbal one.
Blackstone says that the legislature has provided (by the act of
which ours is a transcript) against any fraud in setting up nuncupative wills by so numerous a train of requisites that the thing itself
has fallen into disuse, and is hardly ever heard of; but in the only
instance where favor ought to be shown to it is when the testator is
surprised by sudden and violent sickness. 2 Bl. Com. 501. A
nuncupation can only be sustained when it is the result of sheer
necessity. If the decedent could have made a testamentary disVOL. XXXV.-72
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position in the way prescribed by statute, a nuncupative one will be
of no avail. In the case under consideration, it would seem that
the decedent deliberately selected the nuncupative method, and
made the nuncupation, not because she had not time to make a
written will (she had such time), but because she was under the
impression that a verbal one, if made in the presence of three witnesses, was, whenever made, whether in sickness or health, equally
valid with a written one made according to the statute.
The case of Bebden's Will, 20 N. J. Eq. 473, referred to by the
appellant's counsel, sheds no light upon this. There the only
question was whether a will drawn by an attorney at the request of
the testator, and pursuant to his instructions, a few hours before the
death of the latter, but not executed, the execution thereof being
postponed by the testator until the Christian name of a legatee
could be ascertained, and the testator should feel stronger, could be
admitted to probate as a nuncupative will. In the case in hand the
testatrix was not in extremis. She lived nine days after the making
of the alleged nuncupation, and in fact had testamentary capacity
for several of those days. There was no necessity of making a
nuncupative will. She could have made a written one. The proof
of this fact is clear.
The decree of the Orphans' Court will be affirmed, but without
costs.
1. It seems to be generally conceded,
that in the first place, nuncupative wills
were not required to be made during the
last illness of the testator: 1 Redf. on
Wills *185.
Prior to the enactment of the Statute
of Frauds, such wills had come into much
disfavor, and the early authorities clearly
indicate that they were made commonly,
at least, when the testator was near
death and had not time or opportunity to
make a written will: Bac. Abr. title
" Wills and Testaments," e; Swinb.
pt. 1, sec. 12. But Chancellor KENT, quoting the latter authority, said: "I do
not infer from these passages, that unwritten wills were always had at common
law, unless made in case of extremity,
when death was overtaking the testator:"
20 Johns. 501.
By the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II.,

see. 3), it was provided, that, except as
to soldiers and sailors, a testator must'
have been in is "last sickness," to make
a valid nuneupative will. It is believed
that the same words are used in the
statutes of all the states of the Union
which recognise the validity of such wills.
See 3 Jarman (Rand. and T. notes)
755 n.
2. Prince v. Hazleton, 20 Johns. 501,
is the leading case upon the doctrine that
the words "last sickness" are to be
understood as meaning in extremis. In
that case the alleged testator lived six
days after the time the will was claimed
to have been made. After a lengthy and
careful review of the early authorities,
KENT, C. J., said: "Upon the strength
of so much authority, I feel myself warranted in concluding that a nuncupative
will is not good, unless it be made by a
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testator when he is in extremis, or overtaken by sudden and violent sickness,
and has not time or opportunity to make
a written will. * * * *
"Ifunucupative wills can be permitted
at all, in the cases of chronic disorders,
which make silent and slow, but sure and
fatal approaches, it is only in the very
last stage and extremity of them."
The dissenting opinion by Justice
WOODWORTH in this case, is able and
discriminating, and has been cited and
approved by the courts of other states.
The rule that the maker of a nuncupative will must be in extremis, has been
followed with great strictness in Pennsylvania. In Boyer v. Frick, 4 W. & S.
357, the declaration of the testatrix's
will was made on Thursday, in expectation of a surgical operation for strangulated rupture, under which she had
labored from the preceding Monday, and
which terminated fatally on the following
Saturday. It did not appear that subsequent to the operation she could have
made a written will, but did appear that
she might have done so during the four
hours intervening between the time the
operation was decided upon and its performance. The will was held invalid.
In re Yarnall's Will, 4 fRawle 46, the
testatrix had been affected with pulmonary consumption for six months, and
being very weak and in expectation of
death, made a nuncupative will. After
this she lived nine days. In declaring
the will invalid, as not having been made
in extremis, the court expressed a doubt
whether one affected with such a longstanding disease could make a nuncupative will. See also Werkheiser v. Weykheiser, 6 W. & 5. 184; Haus v. Palmer,
21 Penn. St. 296.
In O'Neill v. Smith, 33 -Md. 569, one
who had been sick for fifteen years and
confined eight months with consumption,
made a nuncupative will and died within
twenty-four hours. The will was declared void, as not having been made in
extremis, it appearing that the testator

retained his senses to the lat. Bat see
Brayfield v. Brayfield, 3 H. & J. 208.
That "last sickness " should be construed to mean in extremis, seems also to
be the rule in Georgia and Virginia:
Ellington v. Dillard, 42 Ga. 361 ; Reese
v. Hawthorn, 10 Grattan 548.
In Smith v. Smith, 63 N. C. 637, it
seems to have been assumed that "last
sickness " means in extremis, as is also
the case in Lucas v. Goff, 33 Miss. 629 ;
but in the later case of Saddler v. Saddier, 60 Id. 251, the Mississippi court
refused to announce such a doctrine
without the particular facts of the case
before it. It however said: " 'Last
sickness,' should not be extended over a
lingering disease, covering months or
weeks, during which and after the spoken
words, there was afforded both by the
mental and physical condition of the
party every opportunity and inducement
to prepare a written will."
3. On the other hand, the courts of
Alabama, Illinois and Tennessee, have
rejected the rule, that "last sickness"
should be construed to mean in extremis.
In Johnston v. Glassrock, 2 Ala. (N.
S.) 218, 239, the testator appears to
have lived at least five days after the
declaration of his will, the court said :
"If a person in his last sickness, that
sickness of which he subsequently diesimpressed with the probability of approaching death, deliberately makes his
will, conforming to the statute, we do
not fbel authorized to say that it will be
invalid, because, in point of fact, he had
time and opportunity to reduce it to
writing." The contrary dictum in Sykes
v. Sykes, 2 Stewart 364, is expressly
overruled.
In Harrington v. Stees, 82 11I.50;
s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 290, the testator
died of quick consumption three days
The
after the declaration of his will.
court said: " At common law it was
not essential to the validity of a nunenpative will, that the testator should have
bedfiill at all. The statute is, in this
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regard, a limitation of the common-law
powers. The words ' in the time of the
last sickness ' had no technical signification at the time of the passage of the
statute. These words must be taken in
their ordinary signification. The courts
have no power to take from or add to

of the sickness or its duration. Nor
will it affect the will to show that the
testator might, without difficulty, have
reduced his will to writing."

4. By the terms of the Statute of
Frauds, soldiers and sailors may dispose
of personal property by nuncupative
wills, "as before the making of this act."
the statute. * * * It is a reasonable and
necessary implication, that it must also It would seem, that if the rule ever obappear that the testator, at the time of tained at common law, that the maker
making the will, supposed that his then of a nuncupative will must be conscious
of the near approach of death, it was
sickness would prove his last sicknessin other words, that he should be im- not properly applied to the cases of
pressed with the probability that he would soldiers and sailors ; and that the peril
of such a life was always considered
never recover. * * * It is not necessary
that the testator should have been with- sufficient to justify the making of an unout hope of recovery. It is an adage, written will while in actual service.
Vandeuzer v. Gordon, 39 Vt. Ill;
I So long as there is life there is hope.'
There may well be hope while the mind Leathers v. Greenacre, 53 Me. 561 ; I
is impressed with the probability of Redf. Wills *191. For this meaning of
Neither was it regarded of the term "actual military service," see
death."
importance to the validity of'the will, the last authority.
5. It has been held in many cases
that the testator appears to have had
time and opportunity to make a written that where one is prevented by the act of
will.
God from completing a written will, and
has declared his full intentions with the
In Aeolan v. Gardner, 7 Heisk. (Tenn.)
215, the testator, though very sick when formalities necessary to establish an unthe will was declared, lived six days written will, the instructions so given or
afterwards, and was sometimes able to the uncompleted will may be proved as a
walk about the house. Concluding an nncupative will: Offutt v. Oftutt, 3 B.
argument very like that of the Illinois Mon. 162; Phaebe v. Boggess, 1 Grat.
case, the court said : "Perhaps in this 129 ; Stricker v. Grover, 5 Whart. 397 ;
case it is not proper to do more than to Aurand v. Wilt, 9 Penn. St. 54 ; Mason
say that it must appear that at the time v. Dunman, 1 Munf. 456; Boofter v.
of making the will the testator was sick, Rogers, 9 Gill 44 ; Frierson v. Beall, 7
and as the authorities indicate, that he Ga. 438; Parkison v. Parkison, 12 Sm.
must have acted in contemplation of & M. 672.
Contra: Dockum v. Robinson, 6 Fost.
death from this sickness ; that it must
further appear that it was his last sick- 372 ; Vinn v. Bob, 3 Leigh 140; Reese
ness ; that is, this sickness must continue v. Hlawtlorn, 10 Grat. 548. See also
until the testator dies ; that the par- Porter's Appeal, 10 Penn. St. 254.
CHAS. A. ROBBINS.
ticular attack of disease or 'sickness'
Nb.
Lincoln,
is
given
must end in death ; but no rule

as to the violence or particular character
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Court of Appeals of .New York.
BANK OF BATAVIA, RESPONDENT, v. NEW YORK, LAKE ERIE &
WESTERN RD. CO., APPELLANT.
Where the principal has clothed his agent with power to do an act upon the existence of some extrinsix fact necessarily and peculiarly within the knowledge of the
agent, and of the existence of which the act of executing the power is itself a
representation, a third person dealing with such agent in entire good faith, pursuant
to the apparent power, may rely upon the representation, and the principal is estopped
from denying its truth to his prejudice.
A local freight agent of a railroad company, having a right to issue bills of lading,
but only upon actual receipt of property for transportation, issued bills of lading for
sixty-five barrels of beans to one Williams, describing them as received to be forwarded to one Comstock as consignee, but adding with reference to the packages
that their contents were unknown. Williams drew a draft on the consignee, and
procured the money upon it of plaintiff's bank, by transferring the bills of lading as
security. It turned out that no barrels of beans were shipped or received by the
railroad company, and that the bills of lading were the product of a conspiracy between Williams and the freight agent to defraud any one who could be induced to
advance money upon the faith of the false bills. field, in an action by the bank
against the railroad company to recover damages for the fraudulent issue of the bills
of lading, that the facts brought the company within the above rule of estoppel, and
that it was liable to the plaintiff.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court.

The facts appear in the

opinion.
-E.C. Sprague, for appellant.
R. -E.Sickels, for respondent.
FINCEi, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
It is a settled doctrine of the law of agency in this state that
where the principal has clothed his agent with power to do an act
upon the existence of some extrinsic fact necessarily and peculiarly
within the knowledge of the agent, and of the existence of which
the act of executing the power is of itself a representation, a third
person dealing with such agent in entire good faith, pursuant to the
apparent power, may rely upon the representation, and the principal is estopped from denying the truth to his prejudice: North
River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill 262 ; Griswold v. Haven, 25 N. Y.

601 ; _N. Y., etc., Rd. Co. v. Schuyler, 84 N. Y. 30 ; Armour v.
Mich. Cent. Rd. Co., 65 N. Y. 511.
A discussion of that doctrine is no longer needed or permissible

in this court, since it has survived an inquiry of the most exhaustive
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character and an assault remarkable for its persistence and vigor.
If there be any exception to the rule within our jurisdiction, it
arises in the case of municipal corporations whose structure and
functions are sometimes claimed to justify a more restricted liability. The application of this rule to the case at bar has determined it in favor of the plaintiff, and we approve of that conclusion.
One Weiss was the local freight agent of the defendant corporation at Batavia, whose duty and authority it was to receive and
forward freight over the defendant's road, giving a bill of lading
therefor and specifying the terms of the shipment, but having no
right to issue such bills except upon the actual receipt of the
property for transportation. He issued bills of lading for sixty-five
barrels of beans to one Williams, describing them as received to be
forwarded to one Comstock as consignee, but adding with reference
to the packages that their contents were unknown. Williams drew
a draft on the consignee and procured the money upon it of the
plaintiff by transferring the bills of lading to secure its ultimate
payment. It turned out that no barrels of beans were shipped by
Williams or delivered to the defendant, and the bills of lading were
the product of a conspiracy between him and Weiss to defraud the
plaintiff or such others as could be induced to advance their money
upon the faith of the false bills.
It is proper to consider only that part of the learned and very
able argument of the appellant's counsel which questions the application of the doctrine above stated to the facts presented. So much
of it as rests upon the ground that no privity existed between the
defendant and the bank may be dismissed with the observation that
no privity is needed to make the estoppel available, other than that
which flows from the wrongful act and the consequent injury : N.
Y. Bd. Co. v. Schuyler, supra.
While bills of lading are not negotiable in the sense applicable
-to commercial paper, they are very commonly transferred as security
for loans and discounts, and carry with them the ownership (either
general or special) of the property which they describe. It is the
natural and necessary expectation of the carrier issuing them that
they will pass freely from one to another and advances be made
upon their faith ; and the carrier has no right to believe and never
does believe that their office and effect is limited to the person to
whom they are first and directly issued. On the contrary, he is
bound by law to recognise the validity of transfers and to deliver
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the property only upon the production and cancellation of the bill
of lading.
If he desires to limit his responsibility to a delivery to the named
consignee alone, he must stamp his bill as "non-negotiable ;" and
where he does not do that he must be understood to intend a possible transfer of the bills and to effect the action of such transferees.
In such a case the facts go far beyond the instances cited, in which
an estoppel has been denied, because the representations were not
made to the party injured: Mayenborg v. Raynes, 50 N. Y. 675;
Maguire v. iSfelden, 4 Cent. Rep. 379; 103 N. Y. 642.
Those were cases in which the representations made were not
intended and could not be expected to influence the persons who
relied upon them, and their knowledge of them was described as
purely accidental and not anticipated. Here they were of a totally
different character. The bills were made for the precise purpose,
so far asothe agent and Wiliiams were concerned, of deceiving the
bank by their representations ; and every bill issued not stamped
was issued with the expectation of the principal that it would be
transferred and used in the ordinary channels of business, and be
relied upon as evidence of ownership or security for advances.
Those thus trusting to it and affected by it are not accidentally
injured, but have done what they who issued the bill bad every
reason to expect. Considerations of this character provide the basis
of an equitable estoppel, without reference to negotiability or directness of representation.
It is obvious also upon the case as presented that the fact or
condition essential to the authority of the agent to issue the bills of
lading was one unknown to the bank and peculiarly within the
knowledge of the agent and his principal. If the rule compelled
the transferree to incur the peril of the existence or absence of the
essential fact it would practically end the large volume of business
founded upon transfers of bills of lading. Of whom shall the
lender inquire ? And how ascertain the fact ? Naturally he would
go to the freight agent, who had already falsely declared in writing
that the property had been received. Is he any more authorized
to make the verbal representation than the written one? Must the
lender get permission to go through the freight-house or examine
the books ? If the property is grain, it may not be easy to identify,
and the books, if disclosed, are not the work of the same freight
agent.

576
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It seems very clear that the vital fact of the shipment is one
peculiarly within the knowledge of the carrier and his agent, and
quite certain to be unknown to the transferree of the bill of lading,
except as he relies upon the representation of the freight agent.
The recital in the bills that the contents of the packages were
unknown would have left the defendant free from responsibility for
a variance in the actual contents from those described in the bill,
but is no defence where nothing is shipped and the bill is wholly
false. The carrier cannot defend one wrong by presuming that if
it had not occurred another might have taken its place. The presumption is the other way, that if an actual shipment had been
made, the property really delivered would have corresponded with
the description in the bills.
The facts of the case bring it, therefore, within the rule of
estoppel, as it is established in this court, and justify the decision
made.
The judgment should be affirmed with costs.
All concur.
The above case is the latest one upon
a subject in regard to which there is an
interesting conflict of opinion.
The analogous case of the liability of
a shipowner upon a bill of lading issued
by the master of the ship for goods not
actually received, was first determined in
England, in 1851, in the case of Grant
v. Norway, 2 Eng. L. & Eq. 337. It
was there held that the master of a ship
who signs a bill of lading for goods not
actually received, acts beyond his authority, real or apparent; that the owner
of the ship is not responsible for such an
act of the master, even to a bona fide
endorsee for value of the bill of lading;
and that persons dealing with bills of
lading issued by masters of vessels do
so with notice of the limitation of the
master's authority. This decision was
adopted by the Supreme Court of the
United States in The Schooner Freeman
v. Buckingham, 18 How. 182 (1855), in
which it was held that neither the owner
nor the vessel is responsible to an innocent purchaser of a bill of lading issued
by the master for goods not actually

shipped. The court said, the authority
of the master to issue bills of lading, like
his power to sell the ship, is not an unlimited one,but arises outof anddepends upon
a particular state of facts-in this case
the receipt of the goods ; that the owner
of the ship is not bound unless the facts
exist upon which the authority of the
master depends ; and that it is incumbent
upon those who are about to change their
condition upon the faith of the master's
authority, to ascertain the existence of
all the facts necessary to its valid exercise. Much the same rulings have been
made in the following cases, in which
bills of lading were issued by masters
of vessels ; where the controversy was
between the shipper and the carrier:
Sears v. Wingate, 3 Allen 103 (1861) ;
The Lady Franklin,8 Wall. 325 (1868);
Dean v. King, 22 Ohio St. 118 (1871):
Brown v. Powell Co., L. R., 1o C. P.
562 (1875), where the controversy was
between the carrier and an innocent purchaser of the bill of lading: Hubbersty
v. Ward, 8 Exch. 330 (1853) ; Jesselv.
Bath, L. R., 2 Exch. 267 (1867) ; 7ne
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ing it, to the analogous case of a false
bill of lading issued by a railroad station
agent, and thus came to a conclusion directly opposite that arrived at in the
principal case. It appeared that the
station agent of the railroad was also a
dealer in grain, and was accustomed to
ship carloads of grain to W., at the
same time drawing drafts which we.e
paid by W. on the faith of the accom.*
panying bills of lading. On one occasion the agent fraudulently issued and
forwarded ten bills of lading for corn
purporting to have been received from
himself and consigned to W.; the drafts
lading as security : the cotton not being
accompanying these instruments were
forthcoming, the plaintiff suedthe shipowner; his counsel rested the case on paid by W. upon the faith of the bills of
the doctrines of agency, insisting that the lading and without any knowledge of the
fraud of the agent. In a suit by W.
defendant was absolutely responsible for
against the railroad, the court adopted
the false representations of his agent in
the rule as laid down in Grant v. Northe bills of lading. But the court held
that the agents had no authority to issue way and the other cases mentioned above,
and said that the principles applicable to
bills of lading without the actual receipt
bills of lading used in shipping applied
of the goods, and that the defendants
those used by railroad companies;
to
The
were not responsible therefor.
that any reason for exempting an owner
court, however, added a suggestion, that
in certain cases of fraud or mistake com- of a ship from responsibility for a bill of
mitted by an officer of a corporation, the lading false in this respect, applied, a
rule might be different. After stating fortiori, to a railroad company with
that in the case at bar the question was respect to a bill issued by its station
one of pure agency, it said: 11A corpo- agent, whose authority was much more
limited than that of a master of a vessel ;
ration can be charged with no intelligent
that neither a shipowner nor a railroal
action, or with entertaining any purpose,
made liable upon any
or committing any fraud except as this company could be
of bona fide purintelligence, this purpose, this fraud, is theory as to the rights
; and that as the
notice
without
chasers,
evidenced by the actions of its officers.
depended upon
And while it may be conceded that for liability of the defendant
to bind it, and
of
the
agent
authority
the
many purposes they are agents and are
as by the principles of commercial law
to be treated as agents of the corporation,
above stated the agent had no such auor corporators, it is also true that for
thority, the railroad company was not
some purposes they are the corporation,
responsible. The court further said,
its
are
officers
such
and their acts as
The court did not think, how- that the railroad company was equally
acts."
ever, that this principle applied to the deceived with the plaintiff, and therefore
caseatbar. See, however, St. Louis, 6-c., the latter could not seek relief in the
doctrine that "if one of two innocent
Rd. v. Knight, 112 U. S. 79 (1887).
persons must suffer by a deceit, it is
The Court of Appeals of Maryland,
more consonant to reason that he who
in B. 6 0. Rd. Co. v. Wilkins, 44 Md.
11 (1875), applied the rule as laid down puts confidence in the deceiver should be
the loser rather than a stranger." It
in Grantv. Norway and the cases followLoon, 3 Blatch C. C. Rep. 324 (1870);
La. Nat. Bank v. Lareille, 52 Mo. 380
(1873) ; Thoman v. Burt, 54 Law Times
349 (1886). See also, Coleman v. Riches,
29 Eng. L. & Eq. 323 (1855).
In Pollard v. Vinton, 105 U. S. 7
(1881), the Supreme Court of the United
States affirmed its ruling in TheSchooner
Freemanv. Buckingham. The facts were,
that the agents of the owner of the steamboat issued bills of lading for cotton,
without having received any cotton ; the
plaintiff cashed drafts drawn on him and
accompanied by the fraudulent bills of
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may be noted here that the legislature
of Maryland, at the next session after
the announcement of this decision, passed
an act making law just what the court
said was not law, and declaring that
hills of lading in the hands of bonafide
holders for value, without notice, should
be conclusive evidence of the receipt of
goods, whether they wore in fact received or not: Tiedeman v. Knox, 53
Md. 612 (1880).
The same conclusion was reached in
Hunt v. N. C. Rd. Co., 29 La. Ann. 446
(1877). Here the station-agent of the
defendant issued by mistake a bill of
lading for more hales of cotton than were
actually received ; upon the faith of the
bill and without knowledge of the mistake, the plaintiff advanced money. It
was held that a stranger who advanced
money on the faith of the bill of lading
could not recover against the railroad
company, because the agent had no
authority to bind it for goods not actually received, and that the defendant was
no more liable on such a bill of lading
than a person would be hound by a bill
of exchange signed with his name by one
not authorized to sign it. From this
decision, however, two of the five judges
dissented and thought that the railroad
company was estopped to set up that defence and should be held liable.
In Rebinson v. M. 4- C. Rd. Co., 9
Fed. Rep. 129 (1881), the question was
again considered and the principle of the
above cases applied. The latest case to
the same effect is Williams v. M. J- W.
Rd. 93 N. Ca. 42 (1885) : in this case,
however, the court did not have the benefit of hearing counsel in opposition.
We now come to examine the contrary view.
The decision in the principal case is
certainly correct in the light of the New
York authorities. In N. Y., -c., Rd. Co.
v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30, 1865, the
rule of agency is laid down as quoted in
the principal case, that where a corporation clothes the agent with power to do
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an act, which power depends upon the
existence of some extrinsic fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent
and of the existence of which the fact of
executing the power is of itself a representation, a third party dealing with such
agent in entire good faith, pursuant to
the apparent power, may rely upon the
representation, and the corporation is
estopped to deny its truth. This doctrine was applied in this case to the
fraudulent act of the secretary and
treasurer of the railroad company in
over-issuing stock. See the principle approved in Tome v. ParkersburgRd. Co.,
39 Md. 36, 81, (1873) ; Edwards v.Thomas, 66 Mo. 468 (1877).
The rule was again applied in Armour
v. Rd. Co., 65 N. Y. 111 (1875). Here
the railroad agent issued to M. bills of
lading upon warehouse receipts for lard;
the receipts turned out afterwards to be
forgeries. M. told the agent at the time
that he intended to use the bills of lading to get money with at the bank ; the
plaintiff paid drafts on the faith of the
accompanying bills of lading. In giving judgment for the plaintiff, the court
said that the case of Grant v. Vorway
must be disapproved so far as it stood in
the way of the doctrine that when one of
two innocent persons must suffer by the
fraud of a third, the loss must fall on the
person who reposed the confidence in
the wrongdoer. "The bills of lading
were issued with the expectation that
they would be acted upon by bankers or
other capitalists ; the defendant cannot
complain if they accomplished the purpose for which they were designed. The
representations in the bills were made to
any one who might think fit to make advances on the faith of them. There is
thus present every element necessary to
constitute a case of estoppel in pais; a
representation made with knowledge that
it might be acted upon and subsequent
action on the faith of it to such an extent that it would injure the plaintiff if
the representation was not made good."

BANK v. N. Y., L
The principal case concludes the New
York decisions upon the subject. In
other states there are authorities to the
same effect.
The facts in Brooke v.N. Y., !kc., Rd.
Co., 108 Pa. St. 529 (1885), were the
same as those in the principal case, the
litigation growing out of the fraudulent
actsof the same station-agent, Weiss.
Weiss issued a bill of lading to Williams
for a car-load of barley; Williams attached a draft to the bill of lading and
sent it to the plaintiffs, who paid the draft
on the faith of the bill of lading. No
barley was in fact delivered to Weiss,
the whole affair being a fraud.
The
court said the claim of the plaintiffs to
be made good for the loss by the railroad seemed reasonable and just, notwithstanding the authorities cited in support of the opposite view. "Under the
circumstances the defendant is estopped
from denying what its accredited shipping agent asserted in the bill of lading,
by which the plaintiffs, without any fault
on their part, were misled to their injury.
It is contended that inasmuch as no authority real or apparent to issue bills of
lading without receiving the goods had
been given by the railroad company to
Weiss, it was not responsible for his unauthorized act even to innocent third parties who were misled and injured thereby. We cannot assent to this proposition. It is conceded that the company
did not authorize the issuance of bills of
lading without receipt of the goods, but
it put Weiss in its place to do that class
of acts, and it should be responsible for
the manner in which he conducted himself within the range of his agency."
The same view was expressed in Sioux
City Rd. Co. v. qrst Nat. Bank, 10 Neb.
556 (1880), a case entirely similar to
Brooke v. Rd. Co., supra. Itwas there
said, that as against an innocent purchaser of the bill of lading, it will not
do to say that the agent had authority to
issue bills of lading only in cases where
shipments were made, and no authority
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where no shipments were made." The
company itself has invested its own agent
with power to issue bills of lading, and
when duly issued .they are not the bills
of the agent but of the company. The
representation in the bill of lading is a
representation to any one who sees fit to
make advances on the same ;" and in
such cases the railroad company is estopped to deny the truth of those representations. This principle of estoppel was
entirely overlooked in Grant v. Norway
and the cases following it."
In Svings Bank v.Rd. Co., 20 Kansas 519 (1878), the agent of the defendants issued two original bills of lading
for the same grain, both of which were
negotiated, the plaintiff being the purchaser of one. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and said that the
defendant "ought not to have authority
to issue bills of lading for grain and thus
put it in the power of the holder to treat
with the public on the representation
made in them, and then when money has
been advanced on the faith of such statements by innocent parties dealing in such
paper in the regular course of business,
contradict the representations of the
paper, and thereby injure the persons
who have been misled. The principle
of estoppel does and ought in such cases
to apply."
Very similar to this case is Coventry v.
G. B. Rd. Co., L. R., 11 Q. B. D. 776
(1883). The facts here were that the
railroad agents issued two "delivery
orders" for the same consignment of
wheat. The holder of the one which
was not honored sued the railroad company, and it was held that the company
was estopped from showing that the two
bills referred only to one consignment;
and that judgment should be for the
plaintiff. The court said that "the
conduct of the company showed that they
undertook to deliver to those persons to
whom the delivery-order should be handed over. The documents have a certain
mercantile meaning attached to them,
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and, therefore, the defendants owed a
duty to merchants and persons likely to
deal with the documents. The plaintiffs
advanced money on the faith of the docu.
ments, taking them as security. The
judgment can be upheld only on the
ground of estoppel: Grantv. Norway, or
the principle laid down in it, was nor
referred to ; but it seems plain that if
estoppel applies in this case, it should
also apply in a case where the master
of a vessel issued two bills of lading
for the same goods ; as in Hubbersty v.
Ward, 8 Exeb. 330 (1853), where it
was held that the master's authority was
exhausted by the issuance of one bill,
and subsequent bills issued by him for
the same goods were void, even in the
hands of a person making advances
thereon without notice.
From this review of the cases it appears that the conflict of opinion arises
from the application of different legal
principles to the same state of facts. The
cases following Grant v. Norway hold
that as the master of a vessel or station-agent of a railroad has no authority
to issue a bill of lading for goods not
actually received, the bill as to them is
void ; and an innocent purchaser of such
a bill has no greater rights against them
than such a holder of a void instrument
of any kind has against the supposed
obligor. The opposing cases, however,
look at it in a different light. It may
be very true that an agent has no authority to issue a bill of lading under such
circumstances ; yet the corporation is
estopped to set up that defence. For
whether or not the agent has authority in
any particular case depends upon facts
peculiarly within the agent's knowledge
and about which the public knows and
can know nothing ; and if the corporation, under such circumstances, puts its
agent in a position to make representations upon which the public has a right
to rely and does rely, the corporation
cannot afterwards deny its agent's acts

to the injury of one who has been misled
thereby.
The correctness of this latter view,
from the: mercantile stand-point, cannot
be doubted. Bills of lading, as instruments of commerce, are second in importance only to commercial paper. AIvances are made upon them as often and
as easily, perhaps, as upon any other
kind of security. Every mercantile consideration requires that the greatest security attainable should be represented in
these symbols of property, and that those
dealing in them should be able to do so
with the fullest confidence. Yet the decisions first cited protect the railroad
from the consequences of its own agent's
fraud ; and impair the security of bills
of lading by requiring the merchant or
banker making advances on them to be
sure that the railroad's agent has done
his duty, when the only way he can be
sure is to examine the agent's accounts
and merchandise.
The decisions asserting the railroad's
liability find striking support in the rule
that a bank is bound by the act of its
proper officer in certifying a check, although the bank has no funds to pay it.
Certifying a check, without funds to pay
it, is as much beyond the cashier's or
teller's authority as signing a bill of
lading when no goods are received is
beyond the railroad agent's authority.
Yet no court has decided that a check so
certified is not binding upon the bank
when third parties have acquired rights
under it in ignorance of the true facts.
Nor does the negotiability of the check
and the non-negotiability of the bill of
lading affect the case : for the liability
of the bank is asserted not so much on
the ground of negotiability as on the
ground of estoppel: Bigelow on Estoppel, 4th edit., 516. In a very recent
case the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held, that when the teller of a bank
marked a check good, it was not necessary in a suit against the bank on such

FLANDERS v. BLANDY.
check, to show that the teller's authority

holder of the check so certified, but upon

to certify embraced cases in which the
drawer had no funds. "If his authority as between himself and his principal
was in fact restricted to cases in which
the drawer had sufficient funds, and he
either intentionally or by mistake transcended that authority by marking the
check good when the drawer thereof had
no funds, the consequences of his blunder
should be visited, not upon the innocent

the agent's employers, who put it in his
power to commit the wrong :" Hill v.
NationTrust Co., 108 Penn. St. 1 (1885).
See also, Farmers' Bank v. Butchers'
Bank, 16 N. Y. 125 (1857) ; Aferchants'
Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604, 646
(1870) ; Espey v. Bank of Cincinnati,
18 Wall. 604 (1873).
EDGAR G. MILInR, JR.
Baltimore.

Supreme Court of Ohio.
FLANDERS v. BLANDY.
A father set apart certain United States bonds as a gift to his daughter. The
bonds were never delivered to her, but remained in the possession and under the
dominion and control of the father, with whom they were left at her request and
with his assent for safe-keeping. He collected and transmitted to her the accruing interest on the bonds up to a certain date, but thereafter, and without her
knowledge, authority or consent, invested the bonds in a business in which he
had become interested. He then wrote to his daughter a letter, which by his direction was duly stamped as a contract, in which he promised, if she did not elect
to accept the investment in lieu of the bonds, he would retain it himself, and pay
her two thousand dollars, with interest. The daughter accepted the written promise in lieu of the bonds, and upon the death of her father, brought an action
on the promise against his representative, to recover the two thousand dollars and
interest. Held, 1. That there was no good and sufficient consideration to support
the promise on which the suit was brought. 2. That the transaction between the
father and daughter was not a valid gift inter vivos. 3. That there was no valid
declaration of trust of the bonds in favor of the daughter.

to the District Court of Muskingum county.
The original action was brought by Amanda B. Flanders, the

ERROR

plaintiff in error, against Frederick J. L. Blandy, administrator on
the estate of her father, Henry Blandy, deceased, to recover the

sum of $2000, with interest thereon from the 1st day of April 1866,
upon an alleged promise to her in writing, from her father, to pay
her the same, contained in a letter to her from him dated April 19th
1866. After the commencement of the action Frederick J. L.
Blandy resigned his trust, and George L. Phillips was appointed
administrator, and substituted as defendant in his stead. The remaining facts necessary to be stated are found in the opinion of the

court.

The defendant demurred to the petition.

The court sus-
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tained the demurrer and rendered judgment against the plaintiff.
To reverse the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, the plaintiff prosecuted a petition in error in the District Court, where the
judgment was affirmed. To reverse the decision of the District
and Common Pleas Courts, the present petition in error is prosecuted.
Frank H. Southard, for plaintiff in error.
G. L. -Phillips,for defendant in error.
DICKmAN, J.-As appears from the original petition, the decedent, Henry Blandy, desiring in his lifetime to make some provision
for the support and maintenance of his daughter, the plaintiff in
error, purchased and set apart as a gift to her certain United States
seven-thirty bonds of the par value of two thousand dollars, and
bearing interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum. These
bonds were never delivered to the daughter. She never had manual
possession of them, but by her request and his assent they were left
in the manual possession and under the dominion and control of the
father for safe-keeping. As her residence was distant from his
home, he collected and transmitted to her the accruing interest
down to the 1st day of April 1866. About that time he became
interested in the Cashmere-goat business, and being under the impression that an investment in that branch of business would be
more profitable to his daughter than the ownership of the bonds,
invested them in that business, but without consultation with her,
and without her knowledge, authority or consent. After making
the investment, and on the 19th day of April 1866, by letter of
that date to the plaintiff, stamped as a contract by his direction with
a United States internal revenue stamp duly cancelled, the decedent
promised and agreed to and with the plaintiff, that in case-she did
not elect to accept the investment in the proposed business in lieu
of the bonds, he would retain the investment himself and pay to
her in place of the bonds the sum of two thousand dollars, with interest thereon from the 1st of April 1866. The plaintiff accepted
the offer and promise so made in writing, and having notified the
decedent of her acceptance, he thereupon retained the investment
as his own. It was upon the promise contained in the letter of
April 19th 1866, that the original action was founded.
If the promise in writing by Henry Blandy to pay the two
thousand dollars and interest, was not supported by a good and saf-
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ficient consideration, no right of action accrued to the plaintiff. It
is contended, however, that such a consideration was furnished in
the government bonds which the decedent invested in his business.
The plaintiff claims that the transaction between her father and herself was no less than a valid gift of the bonds to her by him in his
lifetime. We think, however, that she acquired no title to or beneficial interest in the bonds, and that he was never divested of his
absolute ownership therein.
A gift inter vivos has been defined as an immediate, voluntary
and gratuitous transfer of his personal property by one to another.
It is essential to its validity that the transfer be executed, for the
reason that there being no consideration therefor, no action will lie
to enforce it. A gift inter vivos has no reference to the future, but
goes into immediate and absolute effect. To render the gift complete, there must be an actual delivery of the chattel, so far as the
subject is capable of such a delivery, and without such a delivery,
the title does not pass. If the subject be not capable of actual
delivery, there must be some act equivalent to it. "The necessity
of delivery," says Chancellor KENT, "has been maintained in every
period of the English law." The donor must part not only with
the possession, but with the dominion and control of the property.
An intention to give is not a gift, and so long as the gift is left incomplete, a court of equity will not interfere and give effect to it:
G-ray v. Barton, 55 N. Y. 68; Martin v. Funk, 75 Id. 184; 2
Kent Coin. 438; Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns. 52; Pearson v. Pearson, 7 Id. 26; arangiac v. Arden, 10 Id. 293; Hooper v.
Goodwin, 1 Swanst. 486; Picot, Adm'r, v. Sanderson, 1 Dev.
809 ; Penningtonv. Gettings, 2 Gill & Johns. 208; Gano v. Fisk,
43 Ohio St. 462. That the rights of creditors may not be prejudiced ; that the donor may not be circumvented by fraud ; that he
may be protected from undue influence, which would result in an
unequal and unjust distribution of his estate; that efficacy may not
be given to donations made under legal incapacity; as well as on
other grounds, gifts inter vivos, like gifts causa mortis, in anticipation of death, are watched with. caution by the courts, and to support them clear and convincing evidence is required.
The record discloses that Henry Blandy, though he intended to
give, never consummated a valid gift of the bonds to his daughter.
They were in his possession, and under his dominion and control,
until he invested them in the Cashmere-goat business. They were
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property of such a nature that they were capable of actual delivery
to his daughter, if he had seen fit so to deliver them. But he never
delivered them to her, actually or otherwise, and when the occasion
arose on which to use them in his business, he then, in the exercise
of an absolute ownership, appropriated them without her knowledge, authority or consent. It is alleged that the bonds were left
with him for safe-keeping ; but he was the custodian of property
which the law regarded as his own, until, for a valuable consideration, or by a perfected gift, he might conclude to divest himself of
all title thereto. His acts indicate that he preferred to hold on to
the bonds to meet any contingency which might necessitate him to
use them, and not to place them irrevocably beyond his reach. His
transmission of the accruing interest to his daughter might indicate an intention to donate the bonds themselves ; but while the
one may be incident to the other, the two are essentially separable
and distinct, and a delivery of the one is not a delivery of the
other. If, before the decedent invested them in his business, the
plaintiff had demanded possession of the bonds and been refused,
she could have shown no consideration establishing a title whereby
she might maintain an action, to recover either the bonds or their
value in money. An agreement proved to set apart the bonds for
her support and maintenance would not have availed. An agreement to give for the consideration of love and affection, whether
the gift is to be of goods and chattels or of a chose in action, neither
transfers the property to the donee, nor secures him a right by suit
to compel a completion of the contract: Carpenterv. Dodge, 20 Vt.
595.
The original petition contains an allegation that the bonds were
a gift from the decedent. But it is further contended that there
was not only a gift, but that the father constituted himself a trustee
for his daughter. In this connection the language of the court in
Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 430, finds a direct application to the
present case. "The transactions," says RAPALLO, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, "is sought to be sustained in two
aspects. First, as an actual executed gift; and secondly, as a
declaration of trust. These positions are antagonistic to each other,
for if a trust was created, the possession of the bonds and the legal
title thereto, remained in the trustee. In that case there was no
delivery to the donee, and consequently no valid executed gift;
while if there was a valid gift, the possession and legal title must
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have been transferred to the donee, and no trust was created."
It is manifest that there was an inchoate gift of the bonds by the
decedent which he never completed; but we find nothing that can
be construed into a declaration that he regarded himself as standing
in reference'to the bonds, in a fiduciary relation to his daughter.
If a gift is imperfect at law, and for want of consideration cannot
therefore be enforced, a court of equity will not aid the donee by
construing it into a declaration of trust. In Milroy v. Lord, 4 De
Gex, F. & J. 274, in referring to the modes of making a voluntary
settlement, the principle is announced, that if the settlement is
intended to take effect by transfer, the court will not hold the
intended transfer to operate as a declaration of trust, for then every
imperfect instrument would be made effectual by being converted
into a perfect trust. The owner of property that is meant to be
donated may, at the last moment before delivering it, change his
mind, and in such case, equity will not virtually divest him of his
property by creating a trust in favor of a volunteer. By the civil
law, however absolutely a donation inter vivos might have been
made, yet, if the object of the donor's bounty proved ungrateful,
he was permitted in certain specified cases to revoke the donation.
But by the common law, when the gift is perfect by delivery and
acceptance, it is then irrevocable, and hence, until there is a final
delivery of the subject, the donor will continue vested with the
title.
The leading case on this point is Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves. 39,
in which Gibbs Crawford made the following endorsement upon a
receipt for one of the subscriptions in the Forth and Clyde Navigation: "I do hereby assign to my daughter Anna Crawford, all
my right, title and interest of and in the enclosed Call, and all
other calls, of my subscription in the Clyde and Forth Navigation."
As this was not a legal assignment, and was therefore without effect
as a gift, it was argued that the father meant to make himself a
trustee for his daughter of the shares. But Sir NY. GRANT, M. R.,
observed, "Mr. Crawford was no otherwise a trustee than as any
man may be called so who professes to give property by an instrument incapable of conveying it. He was not in form declared a
trustee; nor was that mode of doing what he proposed in his contemplation. He meant a gift. lHe says he assigns the property.
But it was a gift not complete. The property was not transferred
by the act. Could he himself have been compelled to give effect
VOL. XXXV.-74
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to the gift by making an assignment? There is no case in which
a party has been compelled to perfect a gift, which, in the mode of
making it, he has left imperfect. There is locus pcenitentie as long
as long as it is incomplete."
In Jones v. Lack, L. R., 1 Ch. 25, a check for 9001. was put by
the father into the hands of his child, signifying in strong terms
his intent to give in prcesenti the check to the child. He subsequently took the check and locked it up, saying he should keep
it for the child, and died the same day. A bill was brought in
behalf of the child against his father's representatives, to enforce
his interest in the check as a trust. Lord CRANEWARTTH said:
"This case turns on a very short question, whether the father intended to make a declaration that he held the property in trust for
the child; and I cannot come to any other conclusion than that he
did not. * * * It was all very natural, but the father would have
been very much surprised if he had been told that he had parted
with the 9001. and could no longer dispose of it; and that the
child, by his next friend, could have brought an action of trover for
the check." See Carr v. Silloway, Ill Mass. 24.
It is obvious and well settled by authority, that before the owner
can be held as a trustee for the benefit of a mere volunteer, there
must be a distinct, perfect and unequivocal declaration of trust.
There should be an expression of an intention to become a trustee,
not that the owner should use technical words or language, but he
should declare in unmistakable terms that he meant to stand in a
fiduciary relation to the object of his bounty. The record shows
no such declaration by the decedent, and his acts were wholly inconsistent with the idea of making himself a trustee. There are
no reasonable grounds for concluding that when he invested the
bonds in his business, without the knowledge of his daughter, he
deemed himself as acting under a trust which he had assumed and
declared. If in the alleged purchase and setting apart of the bonds
as a gift to his daughter, and assenting to their being left in his
custody, he had made use of words expressing a gift which was
never perfected by delivery, such-words would have shown an intention to give property over to another, and not to retain it in his
(the donor's) hands, for any purpose, fiduciary or otherwise: Bichards v. Delbridge, L. R., 18 Eq. 11, 15. In the case last cited,
Delbridge, who was possessed of leasehold business premises and
stock in trade, purported to make a voluntary gift in favor of his
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grandson, E. B. Richards, who was an infant, and assisted him in
his business, by the following memorandum signed and indorsed on
the lease: "This deed and all thereto belonging, I give to E. B.
Richards, from this time forth, with all the stock in trade." The
lease was then delivered to the mother of the grandson, in his behalf. It was held by Sir G. JESSEL, M. R., that there was no
valid declaration of trust of the property in favor of the grandson.
In the same line of decision are numerous other authoritative cases,
but we deem it unnecessary to refer to them.
The Court of Common Pleas and District Court did not, in our
opinion, err in sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff's petition,
and the judgment of those courts should be affirmed.
Judgment accordingly.
It is doubtless true that, generally
speaking, a physical delivery of the thing
is essential to constitute a valid gift. At
one time it was the rule that an actual
manual delivery was necessary, but the
courts have since so modified or enlarged
it, so as to allow constructive and symbolical deliveries, and when the facts
would not establish a delivery, but
showed a clear case of gift, the courts
seem to have made it effectual, as an
equitable assignment or a declaration of
trust; so that it could now be said that
facts showing an executed intent would constitute a sufficient delivery ; that is, this
rule could be deduced from the cases.
The foregoing opinion shows the opposite view, to sustain which there are
some well considered cases.
It is the object of this note to present
the other view.
The cases which will be given will
show that a delivery is actual or constructive ; actual when there is a physical or manual delivery, and constructive
when the act or acts of the donor show
that he dispossesses himself of the ownership of the thing and vests it in the
donee without manual delivery of the
thing, as the delivery of the key of a
trunk, with a declaration of a gift of the
contents: Marsh v. Fuller, 18 N. H.
360; Allerton v. Lang, 10 Bosw. 362 ;

Cooper v. Burr, 45 Barb. 9; Penfieldv.
Thayer, 2 E. D. Smith 305; the declaration of gift pointing it out so that donee could take possession : Allen v.
Cowan, 23 N. Y. 502 ; Caldwell v.
Wilson, 2 Spears 75; Winter v. Winter,
9 W. R. 747 ; or the declaration merely,
if the donee has possession: Wing v.
Merchuant, 57 Me. 383; Tenbrook v.
Brown, 17 Ind. 410; or a bank deposit
by the delivery of the pass-book : Camp's
Appeal, 36 Conn. 88 ; Hillv. Ste'enson,
63 Me. 364 ; and in any case where the
facts show an executed intention. In
the principal case it is held that there is
no delivery where the thing is continued
in the possession of the donor, even at
the request of the donee ; that "to render
the gift complete there must be an actual
delivery of the chattel so far as the subject is capable of such a delivery, and
without such a delivery the title does not
pass." In Rerr's Appeal, 5 W. & S.
494, the husband placed coin in a drawer, stated it was for his wife, locked it,
and gave the key to his wife. The drawer
was the husband's, and he continued for
years to have free access to it, and it was
held that this was a good delivery. Here
there was no actual delivery, and there
was not such a delivery as the subject
was capable of. This was approved and
followed in Crawford's Appeal, 61 Pa.
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St. 52, where the court state that the
question involved was whether the facts
showed an executed intention, followed by
a trust. The facts were that the husband
entered on his cash book a certain sum
to his wife's credit, and also added the
interest as it became due, and told his
wife this was for her, and it was held a
valid gift; that the intention was executed by the entry on his books, and that
lie constituted himself a trustee for his
wife ; citing Larkin v. Alfullin, 13 Wright
34; Flowers's Case, Noy 67. And so
where the husband directed the delivery
to his wife of certain county bonds when
issued, stating that she should have them,
and the bonds were subsequently delivered to her: Whiting v. Barrett, 7
Lans. 108, ruling that a parol gift of
property not in esse, or not in the possession or under the control of the donor
at the time of the gift, is valid where the
donee subsequently and before revocation obtains possession. In Shower v.
Pilck, 4 Exch. 478, it was held that a
mere verbal gift, unaccompanied with delivery, could not be made; but in Spratly v. Wilson, 3 E. C. L. 10, and Champney v. Blanchard, 39 N. Y. 111, it was
held that it could, as held in Whiting v.
Barrett. In pratly v. Wilson, the
goods were at York, and the parties were
in London, and the donee was allowed
to maintain trespass against a stranger
upon his constructive possession.
In Stevens v. Stevens, 9 N. Y. (2 Hun)
470, it was held that the verbal giving
of a note which was in a bureau drawer,
presumptively accessible to the husband,
was a good delivery ;' but the verbal gift
of a note held by a third person as collateral security for a loan was not ; the
court seemingly making the distinction
that in the former the husband could take
or get possession, but not so in the latter
case ; yet there is no reason why he could
not get possession of the latter as well as
the former.
A declaration of the intent to give,
and an endorsement of the name of the

donee on the back of a lottery ticket,
and a subsequent re-affirmation of the
gift, was held a valid gift in Grangiacv.
Arden, 10 Johns. 293; and a declaration
by the donor that he gave to the donee
his trunk and all that was in it, constituted a valid gift of money in a savings
bank, the pass-book of the donor being
in the trunk at the time, notwithstanding the donee did not take any actual or
manual possession of the trunk or the
pass-book (Penfield v. Thayer, 2 E. D.
Sm. 305), on the ground, it is presumed,
that as the donee occupied the same room
with the donor, and in which was the
subject of the gift, he could take manual
possession, or it was in his power to do
so. The purchaser of household furniture at a sale under a chattel mortgage,
gave it to the wife of the mortgagor, in
whose possession and use it was, saying
to the wife, "I give you all the property
I have purchased this day," was held a
valid gift, and against the mortgagor's
creditors, although the donor never had
possession, had not seen all the furniture
purchased, and there was not, at any
time, an actual change or transfer of
the use or possession: Allen v. Cowan,
23 N. Y. 502; 28 Barb. 99. The intent
to give, executed, and the power to
assume possession by the donee, and
not the total exclusion of the power of
the donor to resume, is the governing
element in such cases; as the handing
to the donee (who had lived with the
donor for twenty-seven years) the keys
of the bureau and trunks, saying, "here
are the keys: I give them to you; they
are the keys of my trunks and bureau;
take them and keep them, and take good
care of them ; all my property and every
thing I give you; you have been a good
girl to me. You know I have given it
all to you, take whatever you please; it
is all yours, but take good care of it,"
was held in Cooper v. Burr, 45 Barb. 9,
to he a good delivery and a valid gift
of the coin and jewelry in the bureau
and trunks, because, as the court stated,
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the langnage and the act "evinced the
intention of the donor and placed the
donee in the possession of the means of
assuming absolute control at the donee's
pleasure." In this ease there was over
ten thousand dollars at stake. The donee
lived with the donor, and the declaration was made and keys delivered about
six weeks before the donor died. Such
declaration and delivery of the key was
held sufficient in Jones v. Selby, Prec. in
Ch. 300; Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns. 55;
Smith v. Smith, 2 Vernon 92; Chapin
v. Rogers, I East 194 ; Marsh v. Fuller,
18 N. H. 360; Allerton v. Lang, 10
Bosw. 362; Penfield v. Thayer, 2 E. D.
Smith 305, holding that it was a symbolical delivery, on the ground that the
facts and circumstances were such that
the delivery of the key was considered
equivalent to actual delivery, in that it
gave the means of obtaining the use and
command of the subject (Noble v. Smith,
supra),'or,in other words, if the thing is
placed within the power of the donee by
a delivery of the means of obtaining it,
it is a good delivery of the thing: Harris v. Clark, 3 Comst. 93; Hunter v.
Hunter, 19 Barb. 635 ; Pbrish v. Stone,
14 Pick. 206; Allen v. Cowan, 28 Barb.
101 ; contra, 2 Kent Com. 438; Huntingdon v. Gilmore, 14 Barb. 243; Woodruff v. Cook, 25 Barb. 512. The language, "My trunk, up-sti-s, and what
is in it, I give you ; there is enough in
it to take care of you for a spell," the
trunk being in a room in the common
occupancy of the donor and donee, in a
boarding-house, followed by the donor
immediately quitting the house, without
any intimation of an intention to return,
though he did return afterwards, was a
good delivery: Penfieldv.Thayer, 2 E. D.
Smith 305. And the laugnage in effect
stating that whatever the donor had
brought to donee's house he did not intend to take away, but should be her's,
was a good delivery: Smith v. Smith,
supra ; but this was a nisi prius case. In
Taylor v. Taylor, 12 N. Y. (5 Hun)
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115, it was held that a manual delivery
of the thing given is not necessary, but
that a delivery to a third person as trustee or bailce of the donee is sufficient,
and that the donor may by an apt declaration to that effect, convert himself into
a trustee for the donee; following Gray
v. Barton, 55 N. Y. 72; but this was an
action for conversion of property ; though
the principle is the same. It was applied
in a gift mortis causa in Grymes v. Hone,
49 N. Y. 17, where the testator owned one
hundred and twenty shares of bank stock
in one certificate, assigned in writing
twenty of the shares to plaintiff, and
handed them to his wife, with instructions
to be kept by her until his death, and then
delivered to the plaintiff. The'donor
died five years thereafter, and the court
held that this was a valid gift and a
good delivery, and that a judgment requiring the production of the certificate
and a transfer of the twenty shares was
proper; because the wife was the agent
of the donor, and the trustee or bailee
for the donee. And the delivery of the
assignment in such a way made the donee
the equitable owner, and failure of transfer on the bank's books could not interfere:-Rd. v.Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 80; McNeil
v. Bank, 46 N. Y. 325. In Dufjield v.
Elwes, 1 Bligh. N. S. 497, it was held,
that in such cases the representatives of
the donor were trustees for the donee, by
operation of law, to make the gift effectual. This was held in Ex parle Pye,
18 Yes. 140; Kekewich v. Manning, I
De G. M. & G. 176, and Richardson v.
Richardson, L. R., 3 Eq. Ca. 686, and is
an extension of the law as laid down by
Lord HARDWicic

in Ward v. Turner,

2 Ves. Sr. 431.
The following hold that a delivery to
a third person is a good delivery to the
donee: Drury v. Smith, 1 P. Wins. 404 ;
Sessions v. Moseley, 4 Cush. 87; Constant
v. Schuyler, 1 Paige 316 ; Borneman v.
Sidlinger, 8 Shep. (Me.) 185 ; Wells v.
Tucker, 3 Binn. 366 ; Grover v. Grover,
24 Pick. 261 ; Chase v. Reddlng, 13
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Gray 418; Bates v. Kempton, 7 Gray
382; Westerlo v. DeWitt, 36 N. Y. 340;
Walsh v. Sexton, 55 Barb. 251.
It was observed by Lord Justice
KNIGHT BRUCE, in Kekewich v. Manning, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 187, that it
is upon legal and equitable principle
clear that a person suijurisacting freely,
fairly, and with sufficient knowledge,
ought to have, and has it in his power,
to make, in a binding and effectual manner, a voluntary gift of any part of his
property, whether capable or incapable of
manual delivery, whether in possession, or
reversionary,or howsoever circumstanced."
Having notes made payable to the donee, and the parol declaration by donor
that he intended these to be in full as the
shares of his children in his property,
was held to be a good delivery, and that
possession of the notes afterwards by the
donor was as trustee for the donees :
Fulton v. Fulton, 48 Barb. 590; the court
holding that "an actual transmutation
of possession is not essential where the
donor intends to convert himself into
a trustee and makes a sufficient declaration to that effect." The same principle
is found in Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. 149,
where an agent, instead of purchasing
an annuity in the name of the donee, as
directed, purchased it in the name of the
donor, who subsequently declared in
writing that the annuity was for donee.
Lord ELDo- held the donor a trustee for
the annuitant. And the same is asserted
in Wheatley v. Purr, I Keen 551 ; Meek
v. Kettlewell, I Hare, 470; McFadden
v. .Tenkyns, 1 Hare 458 ; Tames v. Bydden, 4 Bea. 600; Thorpe v. Owen, 5
Beav. 224; Scott v. Simes, 10 Bosw.
314; Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns. Ch.
329; Souverbye v. Arden, I Id. 240;
Van Deusen v. Rowley, 4 Seld. 360;
Scrugham v. Wood, 15 Wend. 545.
"Delivery," said Chancellor KRENT,
"in this as in every other case, must be
according to the nature of the thing. It
may be constructive. It must be an actual delivery so far as the subject is capa-

ble of delivery. It must be secundum
subjectam materiam, and be the true and
effectual way of obtaining the command
and domain of the subject :" 2 Kent
Com. 439. Not exclusively physical, but
physical or constructive, as the nature
of the case admits. "It is only," said
the court in Fulton v. Fulton, " when
something remains to be done by or in
behalf of the donor, which is not done,
that the gift fails to take effect," as is
shown in Harris v. Clark, 3 Comst. 93,
and ronsv. Smallpiece, 2 B. & Aid. 552.
The act of delivering a note or other
obligation of a third person to a donee
as a gift, only furnishes evidence that it
was intended by the donor as a gift of
the money payable thereon. The evidence of that intention may as well be
afforded by a plain and unrevoked declaration of the donor as the taking of the
note in the name of the donee, or an
actual or constructive delivery, the whole
question being, did the donor intend to
make the gift.
Where the testatrix, during her last
illness, sent for her husband, and on his
coming into her room handed him a box
containing bank and railroad stock, and
government bonds belonging to her, and
also handed the key, saying that she gave
him the box and its contents, and the box,
contents and key were taken and retained
by him, the court held this to be a
good delivery, although no transfer of the
stock was signed, and no power authorizing such transfer was signed .by her:
Walsh v. Sexton, 55 Barb. 251 ; and
apparennly upon the sole testimony of the
husband. The court followed Westerlo
v. De Witt, 36 N.Y. 340. Bedell v. Carll,
33 N.Y. 581, is a similar case; the note
was endorsed by the father and handed
to his daughter, who retained possession,
the only witness being the daughter.
This was carried to the extent of allowing the donee to sue the maker in the
name of the donor's administrator, and
against his consent. Grover v. Grover,
24 Pick. 261. In that case the note was
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payable to the order of the donor, who, chian v. Hughart, 28 Ind. 449. But the
without endorsement or other writing, principle announced in Duffleld v. Elwes,
delivered it to the donee, and it was 1 Bligh 497, seems to be well grounded
held, not only that there was a good de- and sustained, that an executed intention
livery, but if the donor received the note is all that is necessary, and that if the deagain with the request that he hold it livery is imperfect, a trust will be enforcuntil the donee call for it cr collect it for ed as an equitable assignment; Jones v.
him, the gift is not disturbed, the donor Lock, L. R., 1 Ch. 25 ; Kek-ewich v. Manbecoming a trustee for the donee, on the iug, supra ; Roberts v. Roberts, 15 W. R.
ground, no doubt, that the delivery was 117; Morgan v. lalleson, L. R., 10 Eq.
an equitable assignment, and the gift 475; Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134;
became perfect and irrevocable: 2 Kent Bandy..Bunting, 78 Pa. St. 210; Wing
Com. 438. Butwas not the endorsement v. Merchant, 57 Ale. 383; Bates v. Kempnecessary to make a legal transfer of the ton, 7 Gray 382 ; Sessions v. Moseley, 4
chose in action. In Miller v. Miller, 3 Cush. 87 ; Snellgrove v. Baily, 3 Atk.
P. Wins. 356, itwas held that this could 214; Hale v. Rice, 124 Mass. 292 ; Hill
not be done, because no property could v. Sheibley, 64 Ga. 529; Elam v. Keen,
pass by delivery, it could only pass by 4 Leigh 333; Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray
endorsement. In Snellgrove v. Baily, 227; Hackney v. Vrooman, 62 Barb.
3 Atk. 214, Lord HAnDWiCKHE held that 650; AfTontgomery v. Miller, 3 Redf. 154;
Crittenden v. Ins. Co., 41 Mich. 442;
it could be done ; gift and delivery
without endorsement would constitute a Curry v. Powers, 70 N. Y. 212; Blasgood donation mortiscausa, or inter vivos, del v. Locke, 52 N. H. 238 ; Howard v.
The Bank, 40Vt. 597 ; Gardnerv.AMerbecause it is an equitable assignment.
This doctrine was followed in Wrightv. ritt, 32 Md. 78 ; Kerrigan v. RautiWright, 1 Cowen 598. In Duffield v. gan, Ibid. ; notwithstanding the ruling in
Elwes, I Sim. & Stu. 243, the Vice Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 430, and the
Chancellor held that a mortgage was not reasoning by RAPAiLLo, J.
The question of the creation of a trust
a subject of such gift by delivery, but the
House of Lords, in the same case, I Bligh on the redelivery of the thing to the
N. R. 497, held that it could, as it was donor, or the continued retention by him,
an equitable assignment. This doctrine seems to be held on the ground that when
was rejected in Wilson v. Carpenter, 17 the gift is made the property, or ownerWis. 512, and Green v. Lanydon, 28 ship, passes and vests immediately and
Mich. 221 ; and adopted in brown v. irrevocably in the donee, and if the donor
Brown, 18 Conn. 410 ; Raymond v. Sel- subsequently acquires possession, or relick, 10 Id. 480 ; but in none of these tains possession after the intention is exeare the English cases considered. In 2 cuted, it is as trustee for the donee:
Kent Com. 439, it is asserted that as to Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 230; Hurst
bills, notes, bonds and other choses in v. Beach, 5 Madd. Ch. R. 351 ; Dufaction, an assignment or some equiva- field v. Hicks, I Dow & C. I ; Howell v.
lent instrument is necessary, and the Mcvers, 4 T. R. 690 ; Heath v. Hall, 4
transfer must be actually executed, which Taunt. 326 ; Jones v. Witter, 13 Mass.
seems to be approved in Dilts v. Steven- 304; Dimn v. Snell, 15 Id. 481;
son, 17 N. J. Eq. 407 ; Phipps v. Hope, Crocker v. Whitney, 10 Id. 316. In
16 0. St. 586 ; Knott v. Hogan, 4 Met. Marston v. Marston, 1 lost. (21 N. H.
(Ky.) 99 ; Carpenter v. Dodge, 20 Vt. 491), the same doctrine was approved,
although in this ease it was a delivery of
595; Taylor v. Staples, 8 R. I. 170;
Pennington v. Gittings, 2 Gill & 3. 208; the notes to a third person, to be used
Kidder v. Kidder, 33 Pa. St. 268 ; Bus- for the support of the donee ; yet inti-
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mating that it would have been good if
made direct: Smith v. Siith, 7 C. & P.
401.. And "sufficient if it appear that
the donor intended an actual gift at the
time, and evidenced such intention by
some act, which may fairly be construed
into a deli very :" Davis v. Ex'rs Davis,
I Nott & McCord 225; as where the
donor "said he had given the property to
his daughter, he must be understood to
have done it with all the solemnities necessary to constitute a gift ; and the subsequent possession with his consent was
sufficient evidence of delivery :" Brashears v. Blassingame, 1 Nott & McC.
223. "By delivery is not meant actual
manual delivery, but any circumstance
showing a clear demonstration of the
intention to transfer and of the other to
accept, and which puts it into his power
or gives him authority to take possession,
is all that is necessary : Reid v. Colcock,
I Nott & McCord 592. In neither of
these cases was there an actual delivery ;
the circumstances and the declarations of
the donor, constituted the gifts whereby
" the jury were authorized to infer from
them every thing that was necessary to
the consummation of a legal gift, including necessarily the intention to give, the
act of giving, the delivery and the con-

sent to accept:" Reid v. Colcock, supra.
As where the jury found that the following words: "I beg you to recollect I
have given that horse to my son," constituted a gift without manual delivery:
Fowler v. Stuart, 1 McCord 504; and
where the words, "Ellen, recollect that
one-half of that property belongs to your
brother Ephraim," was held to vest onehalf in the brother: Jones v. McKee, 3
Pa. St. 496 ; although this was a case
of trust, yet the principle is the same.
In M.ine this doctrine is limited, holding that while a valid gift of a note or
chose in action may be made inter viros
or causa mortis, without endorsement or
other writing, yet such a delivery as the
subject is capable of must be made, as
where the thing, at the time of the gift,
was in the .possession of the donee,
and his ownership subsequently recognised by the donor: Wing v. Merchant,
57 Mle. 386, following Grover v. Grover,
24 Pick. 261 ; Borneman v. Sidlinger, 15
Ale. 429 ; and distinguishing Shower v.
Pilck, 4 Exch. 478 ; Dale v. Lincoln, 31
Me. 422 ; Allen v. Polereczky, 31 Ie.
338.
JxO. F.

KELLY.

Washington, D. C.

Louisville Law and -Equity Court.
ARNOTT v. WATHEN MASON MANUFACTURING CO:
Where a contract of hiring is made for a time certain at monthly wages, and
the servant is tortiously discharged before the expiration of the period of hiring,
he cannot immediately recover the entire amount of wages under the eontract,
both earned and unearned, but he may recover the wages earned, and such recovery will not estop him from bringing an action, after the expiration of the period
of hiring, to recover the wages he was prevented from earning under the contract.

DEMURRER to the petition.
The petition alleged that the defendant, by a written contract
filed as an exhibit, agreed to pay the plaintiff $75 a month for the
space of one year, from October 10th, 1885, in consideration of
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which the plaintiff agreed to work for the defendant as foreman in
its broom factory for the same space of time ; that after the plaintiff had entered upon the fulfilment of said contract, to wit, on the
3d day of February 1886, the defendant, without legal cause discharged the plaintiff from its service. That the plaintiff was
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
That the plaintiff afterwards brought suit against the defendant
for his wages due up to that time under said contract, and on the.
10th day of March 1886, obtained judgment against the defendant
for his wages due on said contract up to that date. That, after the
said 10th of March and before the expiration of the year covered
by said contract, the plaintiff sought work and earned $147, which
he was willing to allow as a credit upon the sum of $525, claimed
as due him for the balance of the one year after March 10th, 1886,
under the contract sued on.
This present suit was instituted on the 4th of April 1887, for the
balance of the salary accruing during the balance of said period
after March 10th, 1886.
The defendant demurred generally to the petition.
TONEY, J. (after stating the factg).-The demurrer is filed upon
the theory that the contract for a year's service (wages payable
monthly) is an entire indivisible contract, and that the suit and
judgment on it (March 10th, 1886), before the expiration of the
year, is a bar to any subsequent suit on the same contract for subsequently accruing wages under it. That in the suit and judgment
of March 10th, 1886, the plaintiff could have recovered not only
the wages due to him monthly up to that time, but also the wages
to become due monthly for the rest of the period covered by the
contract, and that whether the recovery of March 10th, 1886, embraced plaintiff's prospective wages for the balance of the year or
not is immaterial, as the demurrant contends that said recovery
was for the breach of the contract and should have covered prospective as well as accrued wages, and it is therefore a bar to any
subsequent action for subsequently accruing wages under the same
contract.
The court does not think that the case of Powell v. Miller, 10
B. Mon. 186-7, sustains the contention of demurrant ; for it will be
observed that at the time of the institution of the two suits mentioned in that case, under the agreement in reference to the boatload of coal, the money on both items, both the coal which the
VOL. XXXV.-75
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defendant had kept for himself, and for the coal he had sold to
other parties, was past due to the plaintiff, and a cause of action
for the money covered by both items had accrued to the plaintiff;
and rightly enough, it seems to me, the Court of Appeals held that
both items entered as elements into but one cause of action, which
could not be split up into two suits. And so in Mkiller v. Corest,
1 Wend. 487, cited for defendant, the entire price of the hay was
due and owing at the institution of the suit for only a part of it.
The case of Staples v. Goodrich, 21 Barb. 317, is also relied on
by defendant. It does not seem to me to be authority for the position assumed by the defendant in this case. Nor is Phillips v.
Seri'ck, 16 Johns. 136, as may be seen from the language of
SPENCER, J.
Secor v. Sturgis, 16 Johns. 554, also cited by the defendant,
supports the same doctrine, that a judgment concludes the rights of
the parties in respect to a cause of action stated in the pleadings
on which it was rendered when the suit embraces the whole or only
a part of the demand constituting the cause of action. It is plain
to be seen that in all this line of cases there was an entire existing
demand, whether in tort or in contract; an existing cause of action
for a past due indebtedness when in contract, and for a'past committed wrong when in tort, which the courts held cannot be divided
up into separate grounds for a corresponding multiplicity of suits.
Remo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.
The case of Arteburn v. The L. & N. Bd. Co., appealed from this
court, does not, it seems to me, sustain the proposition contended
for by demurrant. That was an action in tort against the railroad
company for damages for the destruction of a wagon. The plaintiff
had before that suit recovered a judgment against the railroad in
another action for the value of four mules killed at the same time
by the same collision that destroyed the wagon. The same act of
negligence caused the destruction of the mules and wagon at the
same time. It was no more competent for the plaintiff to bring one
action for the destruction of the wagon, and one for the destruction
of the mules, than it would have been for him to bring a separate
suit for damages for the loss of each mule, and one for the wagon,
and one for each article or commodity that was in the wagon and
happened to be injured or destroyed. In this case as in the other
cases relied on in defendant's brief, reviewed in this opinion, a
cause of action had accrued ; the indebtedness as a whole was past*
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due and not yet to become due in the actions ex contractu, and the
tortious act or wrong causing the injury had been committed in the
actions ex delicto, and the decisions are uniform in holding, as we
have seen, that in all such cases, it is not competent for the plaintiff to multiply suits and vex the defendants more than once on
account of one existing cause of action. The soundness of the doctrine upon which all these cases rest, no one will question. The
doctrine is elementary and too well established to require the citation of authorities. But these cases bear no analogy to the case
at bar. What is the case presented by the pleadings in the case
at bar ?
The petition presents a case where wages are payable under a
written contract at stated periods for a given length of time, and
the employee or servant is tortiously discharged by his employer
during the currency of said period. The question is can he recover
his whole wages, that is, unearned wages, until after the time at
which by the contract they would have accrued ? If he may,
then a recovery by him at any intermediate time before the expiration of the period for which he was employed, will bar a subsequent
action for wages accruing under the contract subsequent to such
recovery. If such contracts are entireties, and indivisible, there is
great show of reason as well as authority for holding that such a
recovery would operate as a bar to such subsequent action. But I
hold that such contracts are not entireties, because it is well settled
that in such a contract of hiring for a stated period, if the servant
is discharged for a sufficient cause, he still may recover on a quantum meruit for the services actually rendered. This was held in
Jones v. Jones, 2 Swan. (Tenn.) 605. The same doctrine was
"enforced in South Carolina in Eakin v. Harrison, 4 McCord 249 ;
in Maine, in Lawrence v. Gullion, 38 Me. 532; and in Iowa, in
Byerlee v. lendell, 39 Iowa 8*82. In all such contracts it is
believed it will be found that the law will not allow the technical
doctrine of entirety to defeat the more equitable doctrine of apportionment.
Philpott v. Evans, 5 M. & W. 475, was an action before the
day of delivery against a purchaser for refusing to receive corn.
Baron PARKE said: "The plaintiffs were bound to wait until the
time arrived for delivery of the corn, to see whether the defendant
then would receive it." I do not mean to say that there are no
instances under which a party could not maintain an action for a
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breach of contract before the day or time, when under the contract
the act was to be done; for instance, if a man promise to marry a
woman on a future day and before that day arrives marries another,
he is instantly liable to an action for breach of promise of marriage.
This was decided in Short v. Stone, 8 Q. B. 358.
And so if a man contract to execute a lease on a future day for a
certain term, and before that day arrives make a lease to another
party for the same term, the cause of action at once accrues for said
breach: Ford v. Tiley, 6 B. & C. 325.
And so if a man contract to sell and deliver specific goods on a
future day, and before that day sell and deliver them to another,
he is immediately liable on his first contract: Bowdell v. Parsons,
10 East 359.
In all these cases it will be observed that the contracts are essentially entireties, and that the defendant has, before the day, rendered
it impossible for him to perform the contract at the period named
in it. He disables himself by his antecedent acts from performing
his contract at the day named, and that amounts to an immediate
breach. In such a case, the defendant, from the nature of things,
has no locus pcenitentice,and the performance of the contract according to its terms is made an impossibility. Can the same be said of
the defendant in the case at bar, in regard to the wages which under
the contract were payable monthly to the plaintiff after the 10th of
March 1886 ?
In the case of Frost v. Knight, Law Rep., 5 Exch. 326, Chief
Baron KLLY announced, as I think, the true doctrine in such
cases. He quite overturned the decisions of 17ockster v. De La
Tour, 20 E. L. & E. R., which seems to be, up to the decision of
Frostv. Knight, the leading English authority for the contention of
the defendant.
Referring to the decisions upon which Lord CAMPBELL rested
his opinion in that case, he said : "These cases are no authority
at all for the proposition that a declaration by the defendant that
he will not perform his promise amounts in itself to a present
breach of the promise, upon which an action might be at once
maintained."
And referring to the case of .Emmons v. Bllerton, 4 H. of L.
Cas. 624, also cited by Lord CAMPBELL, Chief Baron KELLY, continuing, said: "After dealing with these cases, the judgment, as
livered by Lord CAMPBELL, will be found, when carefully con-
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sidered, to amount to no more than an argument upon the reasonableness of affording some remedy to the plaintiff, where by reason
of the declaration of the defendant that he would not take him into
his service when the 1st of June should arrive, he was obliged
either to remain unemployed until the 1st of June and lose the
opportunity of obtaining another engagement, or to accept any
other engagement that might be offered him, and so disentitle
himself to maintain an action on the ground that he could not aver
that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement."
And further: "If one contracts to do an act on a future day,
and before the day arrives declares to the other party to the contract that he will not perform his promise, the contract is not
broken. It is not a breach at all; it is a promissory or prospective
breach only, a possible breach which may never occur, and not an
actual breach."
To say that the contract is broken is simply to utter an untruth.
One contracts in 1870 to pay another 10001. on the 1st day of
June 1871. To say that the contract is broken before the year
1870 is at an end, is undeniably and self-evidently untrue. Applied to the case at bar, is it not equally clear and uncontrovertible
that the promise of the defendant to pay $75 per month to the
plaintiff in the months following March 1886, was not broken until
the respective times for payment arrive.
Take for instance the wages due to the plaintiff under the contract in the month of April 1886. Can it be said that the defendant broke his contract to pay the April salary before the month of
April arrived ? In other words, can a party be guilty of a breach
of contract to pay money at a certain fixed period or named day,
before the day arrives? A refusal to pay money before it is due,
is not a breach of either an express or implied contract. In order
to constitute a breach of contract, I think the refusal to pay must
be made on the day the money is due and not before. There may
be an expression beforehand of an intention to break one's contract,
but may not a wiser counsel prevail, and a change of mind take
place before the day arrives ? A locus ycenitentie, an opportunity
to change one's mind, must always be indulged in order that repentance may bear its legal fruits.
The petition in this case is for the money which the defendant
agreed and promised to pay plaintiff in the months of April, May,
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June, &c., up to the 10th of October 1886. He sues for his wages
-the specific monthly sums agreed to be paid for his services.
The suit was brought on the contract, which for -and during the
whole year from October 10th, 1885, to October 10th, 1886, is a
subsisting contract between them. And I h6ld under this contract,
the wages must be due and payable before any action for them
could be lawfully commenced and maintained. But when due, and
by the terms of the contract they become due every month, an
action accrued to the plaintiff for the amount so becoming due.
Under this contract the plaintiff could have brought the suit at
the end of every month, or at the end of three, five, or any other
number of months, the wages being expressly made payable monthly: Lord v. Belknap, 1 Cush. 279.
In Badger v. Titcomb, 15 Pick. 409, it was held that a contract
to do several things at several different times was a divisible contract, and that the agreement might be entire, but the performance
was several, and that assumpsit lies for every breach or default in
the performance.
In the case of Cunningham v. Morrill, 10 Johns. 202, KENT,
C. J., after reviewing all of the authorities, fully sustained this
doctrine, overruling Seas v. Fowler, and Hayden v. Bush, in 2
Johns.
To the same effect is .Davis v. Preston, 6 Ala. 83.
In Tow v. ljarste~ler,2 Cran. 114, C. J. MARSHALL said that
a contract for the payment of distinct sums of money at different
periods is very much in the nature of distinct contracts.
An action of debt lies for each sum as it becomes due, and when
that sum is paid the debtor or contractor is forever discharged from
the contract to pay it.
Fowler v. Armour, 24 Ala. 194, was a contract to serve for one
year at a stipulated sum payable monthly ; the servant was discharged without fault on his part, before the expiration of the year.
It was held that the servant might treat the contract as still subsisting, and sue in assumpsit for wages due according to its terms,
or he might consider it rescinded and sue for unliquidated damages
for its breach; that if he sued on the contract (as the petition in
this case shows that the plaintiff's recovery was had in March), he
can only recover the wages due by its terms before the institution
of the suit.
In Jones v. Dunton, 7 Ill. App. Cases, it was held that a con-
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tract to serve a year at a fixed sum payable in regular weekly in.
stalments is divisible as to the remedy, and that the stipulations as
to payment are several obligations.
In Huntinton v. The Ogdensburg JLake ChamplainBd. Co.,
this whole doctrine was reviewed. That was a case in which Huntington, the plaintiff, had been employed by the railroad company
as station agent for ten months from March 1st, 1866, at $100 per
month. On the 7th of June of that year he was discharged without cause. In the month of July, just one month after his discharge,
he brought suit against the company and recovered judgment for
his salary up to the time of bringing the suit, to wit, $100, one
month's salary. The second suit and the one decided in the Supreme Court of that state was brought after the expiration cf the
year for his wages under his contract from the time of his former
recovery in July to the 1st of September, the end of the ten
months of his employment. Said JAmES, J., in that case: "The
single question is, was the former judgment rendered for wages for
the month of June under the contract, a bar to a further recovery
in another suit for his after-accruing wages under the same contract ? It is settled law, "1that only one action can be maintained
for the breach of an entire contract, and that a judgment obtained
by the plaintiff in one suit may be pleaded in bar of any second
proceeding; but the difficulty is to determine in what cases the contract is entire, and the question becomes much complicated in the
consideration of agreement to do specific acts at various prospective
periods. * * * What, then, was the contract in this case ? It
was a hiring at $100 per month. It was, therefore, a contract
containing several stipulations, each stipulation giving a right of
action on its breach. There is no doubt the plaintiff could have
maintained a separate action for each monthly instalment as it
became due, had he not been discharged, but continued to serve.
Having been discharged without cause, his rights were not lessened.
He was not bound to treat the contract as at an end. * * *
He had the right to treat the contract as still subsisting, and could
maintain an action for each instalment as it fell due. I therefore
hold that the former recovery is no bar to this action, and direct
judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict."
Can any one discover any difference between that case and the one
at bar? This doctrine was well recognised in Greenleaf v. Kellogg, 2 Mass. 568; Cooley v. Rose, Id. 221; and in Andover Sav-
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ings Bank v. Adams, 1 Allen 28, in which cases it was held that
a recovery may be had for the interest falling due on a promissory
note, without being a bar to another and subsequent action for the
principal. And in the same state (Massachusetts) it was held that
an acceptance of an order to pay $200 out of the first money of the
drawer received by the drawee from certain claims binds the acceptor to pay on request from time to time as the money is received,
and that a judgment recovered against him (the acceptor) for part
of the sum, on his refusal to pay, is not a bar to another and subsequent action against him for a further sum subsequently received
by him: Perry v. Harrington,2 Metc. (Mass.) 868.
In Sterner v. Gower, 3 W. & S. 136, it was held that a recovery
for certain instalments falling due under a contract would not bar a
subsequent action for subsequent instalments subsequently falling due
under the same contract. To the same effect is Logan v. Caffrey,
6 Casey 200. It seems to me, therefore, that the doctrine is well
settled both upon principle and authority that where a person is
employed (as the plaintiff in the case at bar was) for a definite term
at wages payable monthly, the monthly instalments may be at once
sued for as they become due; and that the wrongful discharge of
the employee or servant will not impair his remedial rights to compensation under the violated contract for constructive service:
Armfield v. Nash, 31 Miss. 361 ; Thompson v. Wood, 1 Hilt. 98;
Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355, and Boogs v. The Pacific ld.
Co., 33 Mo. 212.
In Isaacs v. -Davis,12 Ga. 556, it was held, after a full discussion and review of the authorities, that if a servant is employed for
five months at a specified rate per month, and pending the employment is wrongfully discharged, he may at his option sue at the end
of each month for the monthly instalment falling due under the
contract, or wait until the end of the term of employment, and sue
in indebitatusassumpsit for all the instalments with interest thereon. And as far back as Goodman v. Pocock, 15 Adol. & E. (N.
S.) 580, PATTESON, J., after reviewing the case of Cutter v. Powell, and the annotations thereon in 2 Sm. L. Cas., p. 20, said the
result of the authorities on this subject seemed to be, that a clerk,
servant or agent wrongfully dismissed during his term of service,
has his election of three remedies, viz. :
1st. He may bring a special action for his master's breach of
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contract in dismissing him, and the remedy he may pursue immediately.
2d. He may wait till the termination of the period for which he
was hired, and may then sue for his whole wages, in indebitatus
assumpsit, relying on the doctrine of constructive service.
3d. He may treat the contract as rescinded, and sue immediately
on a quantum meruit for work he actually performed. The learned
judge expresses himself with some doubt and hesitation as to the
second of the above propositions, about which, with becoming
diffidence, it seems to me there is no substantial ground for doubt,
in view of the unbroken current of authorities in its support. The
divisibility of the remedial rights of the plaintiff under the contract
sued on in this case is fully sustained by the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, in Keith's -Ex'rsv. Hinkston, 9 Bush 283. LINDSAY,
J., in delivering the opinion of the court, held that a contract which
bound the obligor to keep a switch or spur in good repair, and to
furnish cars and transport the stock, products and commodities of
the plaintiff, Hinkston, to market, was a divisible contract, and
would admit of an indefinite number of actions for a continued
breach of its said stipulations.
In that case the learned judge said: " The breach of the undertaking is charged to be the removal of the switch and the refusal
by the appellants (the defendants in the court below) to make any
provision for the transportation of appellee's stock, commodities,
&c. It is evident," said he, "that the damages sustained, if any,
result not from the removal of the switch, but from the failure to
replace it at proper times to accommodate Hinkston in the shipment to market of his stock, &c. The failure of appellants to keep
this agreement up to the trial of this action does not entitle Hinkston to recover for like failures for all time to come."
This seems to be an authority directly in point from our own
Court of Appeals. Nor is there anything inconsistent with the
doctrine laid down by Judge LINDSAY in that case in his subsequent decision in the case of The -Elizabethtown & _Paducah Bd.
Co. v. Pattinger,10 Bush 188; nor in the opinion of ROBERTSON,
J., in the case of Chamberlainv. JVclallister, 6 Dana 360.
The breach of the terms and stipulations of the contract by the
defendant for which the plaintiff obtained a recovery in March
1886, did not, I hold, resvind the contract nor extinguish the contractural right of the plaintiff under it; and the plaintiff had the
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